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The Michigan Commission on Death and Dying was created to advise
the state legislature on the politically volatile question of assisted suicide.
Proposals were considered to allow assisted suicide with safeguards, and
to continue the state's temporary absolute ban. Because of the political
composition of the Commission, however, no consensus was reached, and
the opportunity to enact humane but careful legislation seems to have
passed. This paper examines the proposals the Commission considered, the
alliances reflected in the voting, and some problems the Commission failed
to address.
With the election Nov '94 and the December ruling by the
Michigan Supreme Court in various lawsuits involving Dr. Jack
Kevorkian and others, 1 it appears that the absolute, but tempo-
rary2, prohibition on assisted suicide enacted by the Michigan
legislature well over two years ago in order to give itself time to
study the question has now become permanent. The Court has
ruled that assisting suicide is in Michigan a common law felony
which may in certain circumstances be prosecuted as murder.
Though public and medical opinion seem clearly to favor some
form of humane relief,3 in the new state legislature those opposing
assisted suicide are evidently stronger than in the old4, and the
Court's ruling will evidently be allowed to stand as Michigan
law. Thoughtful, balanced legislation which would provide re-
lief of suffering while avoiding certain dangers seen by some, is
evidently not likely to be enacted or even brought to the floor.
Thus a brief window of opportunity to rationalize Michigan law,
which opened with the creation early in 1993 of the Michigan
Commission on Death and Dying, appears to have closed, if not
irrevocably at least for the foreseeable future. The reasons for this
are no doubt many, but perhaps some of the blame can be laid to
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the working of the Commission itself. Created to guide the leg-
islature on this controversial and emotionally-charged issue, the
Commission's 22 members failed to arrive at a consensus position,
and instead of offering clear guidance, produced three proposals,
none of which received more than nine votes. Even more seri-
ous from the point of view of those favoring at least some right
to assisted suicide, none of the three proposals could be taken
seriously as the basis for possible legislation; only one actually
recommended decriminalizing assisted suicide, and this was so
covered with qualifications and restrictions as to raise questions
whether it would be more likely to enable those in need to take
advantage of the right, or to discourage them from doing so.
This paper is an analysis of the commission's proposals and
of the shifting alliances of its members as reflected in the voting. If
there is a moral to be drawn from this, it is that politically designed
commissions are no more likely than legislatures themselves to
arrive at reasonable and humane solutions to emotionally power-
ful problems. The Death and Dying Commission was composed
not of experts but of political constituencies pushing what turned
out to be incompatible agendas; created to buy time and propose
a solution which might to some extent get the legislature off the
hook, the Commission effectively nullified itself because its mem-
ber groups were more interested in defending their constituencies
or points of view than in reaching a workable solution.
The Problem Illustrated
Before turning to the Commission, it might be useful to call at-
tention to two stories reported in the press while the Commission
was doing its work.
In July 1994 the NY Times reported that an 85-year old woman
in Vermont had committed suicide by starving herself to death.
Though in good health, as the Times put it, her eyesight had begun
to fail and she had undergone difficult bladder surgery followed
by colon surgery, incontinence and pneumonia. She celebrated
her 85th birthday, made a last meal of birthday cake, and then
refused all further nutrition. Her physician attended with mor-
phine as necessary for discomfort; she died peacefully in her sleep
after 6 days of fasting. The Times gave her story nearly 10 column
inches (NY Times, July 20 1994). 5
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Mrs. Eddy was luckier, or cleverer, than many of the AIDS
victims studied by a researcher in Vancouver, B.C. He found
that half of the 34 assisted suicides he was able to identify were
botched. In five cases the victims were unsuccessfully suffocated;
in another an attempt was made to slit the victim's wrists with
a razor blade; in two cases heroin was injected unsuccessfully;
in another case, massive doses of morphine, "a month's sup-
ply," were given over a period of four days before death oc-
curred. Similar reports surface elsewhere. "One ethicist told of
a man in Illinois who tried to smother his lover with a pillow but
ended up asphyxiating him just enough to destroy most of his
brain's functions. A New York doctor told of a friend who tried
to kill himself by overdosing on his TB medication. He tried a
second time on Darvon, and failed again." (NY Times, June 14,
1994)
Mrs. Eddy's son is a medical doctor who wrote up his
mother's death in the Journal of the American Medical Association
(Eddy, 1994). It seems that his mother was sicker than the Times'
report acknowledged. "She developed oral thrush, apparently
due to the antibiotic treatment for her diarrhea, and her antide-
pressants got out of balance.., she became anemic, which was
treated with iron, which made her nauseated. She could not eat,
she got weak, her skin itched, and her body ached.., they found
a lump in her breast and atrial fibrillation." After a cholecys-
tectomy, Mrs. Eddy needed second surgery for rectal prolapse.
"She especially hated the thought of more surgery and the intense
postoperative fatigue. On the other hand the prolapse was very
painful ... She knew that she could not possibly walk... again
unless it was fixed... Her main concern was to avoid inconti-
nence." Mrs. Eddy decided to have the rectal surgery, which left
her "totally incontinent 'at both ends,' as she put it. She was bed-
ridden, anemic, exhausted, nauseated, achy, itchy.., her eye-
sight had begun to fail.., she could no longer read."
Mrs. Eddy and her son discussed Final Exit and found it
of little use: "Patients can rarely get the pills, especially ... in
a nursing home... Anyone who provides the pills.., can be
arrested... Even if... the pills are available, they can be difficult
to take, especially by the frail. Most likely, my mother would fall
asleep before she could swallow the full dose. .. "
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Starvation turns out to be the only solution. In a passage
quoted in the Times, Dr. Eddy celebrates his mother's death:
"Without hoarding pills, without making me a criminal, without
putting a bag over her head, and without huddling in a van with a
carbon monoxide machine, she had found a way to bring her life
gracefully to a close," he wrote. "This death was not a sad death,
it was a happy death. It did not come after years of decline, lost
vitality, and loneliness, it came at the right time."
Dr. Eddy's reference to a van with a carbon monoxide ma-
chine is of course an allusion to Dr. Kevorkian, who had recently
been acquitted by a Michigan jury of the felony of "assistance to
suicide" in the death of Thomas Hyde, a victim of advanced amy-
otrophic lateral sclerosis. Dr. Kevorkian had admitted to placing,
in his van, a mask connected to a carbon monoxide machine over
Hyde's face and putting in Hyde's hand the string by which the
machine is operated. 6
Mrs. Eddy's death and the botched attempts of the AIDS
victims provide real-life counterpoint to the opinion of the fa-
mous anti-establishment psychiatrist, Dr. Thomas Szasz. Writ-
ing in the libertarian magazine Reason (Szasz, 1994), Szasz cas-
tigates Dr. Kevorkian as "dangerous," "ominous," "a threat,"
impugns Kevorkian's "purported compassion," and remarkably
implicates Kevorkian as a participant in what Szasz calls "medi-
cine's war on freedom and self-determination." The threat is not
that doctors wish to kill people, but that they wish to control
the means by which this is to be done. But Szasz stops short of
advocating that because their motive is self-aggrandizement, not
compassion, doctors must be prevented from assisting in suicide.
His solution is the free market. "[T]he fact is that neither killing
another, nor killing oneself, nor helping a person kill himself
requires medical expertise," Szasz writes. "Giving a person a
drug to help him commit suicide is like giving him liquor to help
him become drunk... Judging by published reports, the persons
whom Kevorkian has 'assisted' could have ingested a fatal dose
of a lethal drug, had they access to such a drug and the courage
to use it. The fact that drugs used for committing suicide are now
available by prescription only is a cultural-legal artifact. Prior to
1914, lethal drugs, like other consumer products, were available
on the free market." (Szasz, 1994) Whether doctors could safely
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be allowed to administer these drugs or at least advise on their
use without jeopardizing everyone's freedom, Dr. Szasz does not
say. Surprisingly, he fails to mention self-starvation as a method
of free market self-help even simpler than drugs.
The Commission
The Michigan Commission on Death and Dying was estab-
lished by the state legislature to guide it in its deliberations on
the problem presented to it by Dr. Kevorkian. The legislation7
which established the Commission also created the felony of "as-
sistance to suicide," The membership of the commission was es-
tablished by the statute, and consisted of 22 organizations (see Ap-
pendix) which have an interest in the question. Religious groups
were conspicuously omitted, though a Roman Catholic priest
served as representative of a secular organization. 8 Each organi-
zation, among them the Michigan Association of Suicidology, an
anti-suicide group claiming "approximately seventy-five mem-
bers,"("Report," Appendix A, position statement of Michigan
Association of Suicidology) had one vote. Though created with
fairness and breadth in mind, the composition of the Commission
did not in the end please everyone, notably certain disability
advocates, some of whom tend to regard assisted suicide as a
method of disposing of the unvalued disabled, and who proposed
via picketing and disruption 9 that the entire Commission mem-
bership be replaced by people with disabilities (NY Times, Mar. 6,
1994; American Medical News, Ap. 11 1994, pg. 11). Not all the mem-
ber groups took a position, notably two of the most influential,
the Michigan State Medical Society and the Prosecuting Attorneys
Association, both of whom cited disagreement among their mem-
bers as the reason not to commit themselves.10 (The representative
of the state Medical Society, who was also the Commission's
chair, abstained on all votes; however the Prosecuting attorneys
allowed their representative to vote his conscience, which he
did against the proposal decriminalizing "aid-in-dying" and for
the proposal to make the prohibition permanent). The work of
the Commission proceeded in the usual manner: open meeting,
public forums and presentations, scrutiny of documents, subcom-
mittee reports etc.11 But the principle on which the Commission's
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membership was determined and the inability of influential mem-
ber organizations to take a position virtually guaranteed that the
Commission would be deadlocked, as it was.
The Commission did reach consensus on several points, none
more important than that some public policy was required. The
relevant statement is worth quoting in full. "A significant conclu-
sion reached by the Commission is that some permanent policy
regarding assisted suicide should be enacted by the Legislature.
The Commission views the current situation, whereby the ban
on assisting suicide is scheduled to sunset six months after
this report is issued, as untenable. There have been proponents
speaking before the Commission who have favored this "No law"
option. The Commission felt very strongly that this option would
be irresponsible as a matter of public policy and would create
tremendous confusion for the people of the state. A motion was
made and approved ... to eliminate the "No law" option as an
advisable recommendation to the Legislature." ("Report," Part II.
Bold type in original.)
In addition, the Commission unanimously endorsed 13
"points of consensus" ranging from public education on advance
health care directives, to easing access to pain medication. 12
The Votes
The Commission considered three proposals on the question
of assisted suicide. The first, recommending decriminalization
with safeguards, and including a model "death with dignity"
act, received only 9 votes of the 22 member Commission. Seven
members voted against and 6 either were absent or abstained. The
second proposal, "Procedural Safeguards," neither endorsed nor
opposed decriminalization, but recommended a set of safeguards
should the Legislature decide to decriminalize. This also received
9 votes, of whom only 4 had voted for proposal one; five members
voted against and 8 were not present or abstained. Finally, there
was a third report, "opposing legalized assisted suicide;" this
received 5 votes for, 9 against, the others absent or abstaining.
The same five votes cast in favor of the proposal opposing
legalization, also were cast against the proposal to decriminalize.
There were the "hard-core" votes opposed to legalization. They
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were the suicidology group, the Council for Independent Living,
the Head Injury Survivor's Council, The Prosecutors' Association
representative, and Right to Life, the anti-abortion group.
The other two votes against decriminalization-with-safe-
guards came from the osteopathic physicians and surgeons asso-
ciation, and the Michigan Hospice Organization. Both of these
groups abstained on the second and third proposals. Hospice
explained this seemingly inconsistent position as follows: "Rather
than supporting legislation dealing with assisted suicide, the
MHO supports legislation which requires education to address
pain and symptom control and wholistic, supportive care for
those with terminal illness and their families." MHO pointed
out that the 13-point consensus statement contains much of their
position. ("Report," Appendix). It would seem, nonetheless, that
to oppose decriminalization is, at least by implication, to favor
continuing at least some form of prohibition.
There was a bloc of nine organizations that voted yes for the
first proposal, decriminalization-with-safeguards, and against
the third, to oppose legalization. No other organization voted
either for the first nor against the third; these nine organizations
thus constituted a consistent plurality on the commission in favor
of liberalizing the law, a plurality which, however, was unable to
attract the three additional votes needed to become a majority.
They are: the Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Health Care Asso-
ciation, Hemlock, the associations representing nurses, psychia-
trists,13 psychologists, and social workers, the Senior Advocates
Council14 and the State Bar.15
The most interesting proposal in some ways was the second,
the procedural safeguards proposal, which neither endorsed nor
opposed assisted suicide but recommended safeguards should
the Legislature decide to decriminalize. This report was largely
the work of advocates for the disabled. The disability community
struggled with the problem of assistance to suicide, but was un-
able to reconcile the promise of offering to the disabled greater
control over their own lives with the fear of reinforced social
stereotypes and negative valuations of disabled people. Thus
both the head injuries group and the independent living council
formed part of the hard core opposition to assisted suicide, both
groups opposing decriminalization and supporting continuation
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of the ban, while the long-term care group and the retarded cit-
izens group (ARC-Michigan) took no position on either decrim-
inalization or permanent prohibition. The Council for Indepen-
dent Living explained its position in a statement describing its
aim as "to facilitate the unity and empowerment of people with
disabilities." This they explain as "self-determination and having
both the right and the opportunity to make decisions about the
issues that affect one's life." They pointed out that assisted suicide
could be regarded as a form of self-determination, but feared that
a public policy allowing it as an option will reinforce stereotypes
which work against disabled people. "These advocates feel that
by permitting some form of assisted suicide available only to peo-
ple with disabilities and chronic illness, the Michigan legislature
will both provide a subtle coercion for people with disabilities
and chronic illness to end their lives and open the door to active
euthanasia in which the decision to end an individual's life is
made by the medical establishment or dictated by social norms."
("Report," Appendix A)
Proposal two recommended safeguards without either en-
dorsing or rejecting assisted suicide. Three of the five hard-core
pro-ban groups (suicidology, independent living, head injury)
voted yes on proposal two. This position is at least consistent: no
decriminalization, continuation of the ban, but safeguards should
decriminalization be adopted. Of the other two hard-core groups,
Right to Life Michigan (RLM) voted against proposal two and the
prosecuting attorneys abstained, each perhaps fearing that a yes
vote could implicitly be seen as endorsing assisted suicide. 16 By
isolating itself from its allies in the disability community, RLM
demonstrated its more categorical opposition to assisted suicide.
The other two groups who voted no on decriminalization, hospice
and the osteopaths, abstained on continuing the present ban; the
osteopaths also abstained on proposal two, but Hospice voted yes.
The plurality decriminalization alliance split on proposal two:
the ACLU, Hemlock, the psychiatrists, and the state bar joined
RLM and voted no, the health care association, nurses, social
workers and Senior advocates voted yes, and the psychologists
abstained. The other five yes votes on proposal two came from
three of the hard-core opponents of assisted suicide, plus Hospice
and Better Care (the long-term care advocacy group). Both these
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groups abstained on continuing the ban; Hospice voted against,
Better Care abstained, on decriminalization.
These shifting coalitions, and the reasons for the votes, indi-
cate the difficulty of reaching consensus. First, fully five of the
22 members either abstained or were not present for all three
votes; no explanation is given in the report why certain groups
were absent from the voting. Two groups (Better Care and the
osteopaths) abstained on two of the votes, and three other groups
(Hospice, psychiatrists, prosecutors) abstained once. Thus ten
groups were unable to reach a position on at least one of three
proposals. Second, apart from the five total abstainers, no more
than four organizations adopted common positions on all three
votes: health care, nurses, seniors and social workers voted yes on
1 and 2, no on 3; ACLU, Hemlock, psychiatrists and the sate bar
voted yes on 1, no on 2 and 3. Another set of three organizations
voted no on 1, yes on 1 and 2: suicidology, independent living, and
head injuries. That is to say, of the 17 groups voting on at least
one proposal, no more than 4 voted the same way on all three
proposals. (This does not of course take into account unreported
straw votes and other informal measures of viewpoint).
in table form:
1 2 3
Y Y N health care, nurses, seniors, social work
Y N N ACLU, Hemlock, psychiatrists, state Bar
N Y Y suicidology, independent living, head injuries
N N Y Right to Life
A Y A Better Care
N A A osteopaths
N Y A Hospice
Y A N psychologists
N A Y prosecutors
Of course the second proposal complicated matters, splitting
both the 9 member pro group and the 5 member anti group.
Ironically Right to Life joined the most liberal groups, ACLU and
Hemlock, in voting against proposal two. However the second
proposal was in a sense the common ground proposal, neither
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endorsing nor rejecting assisted suicide but specifying what ev-
eryone had agreed on in principle already, the need for legislation
with safeguards and conditions. That even this proposal fared no
better than the others, gaining only 9 of a possible 22 votes, is
significant. Though all favor some kind of legislation, some who
are opposed to decriminalization will not consider safeguards
even hypothetically; some who favor decriminalization oppose
safeguards they regard as unduly burdensome; others so fear
abuse that the safeguards they endorse would make the decrim-
inaliztion almost worthless.
Procedural Safeguards
Since the clear middle-ground position is decriminalization
with safeguards, I shall next examine the safeguards developed
in the first two proposals. There are some differences between the
two proposals but it is difficult to say which set of safeguards is
stricter. I shall quote from the summary of the decriminalization
proposal, the "death with dignity" act:
"Only persons who have a terminal condition (an incurable or
irreversible condition which would likely result in death within
six months) or a condition involving irreversible suffering (an ir-
reversible, progressive, debilitating or degenerative disease with
unbearable or unacceptable suffering emanating from a physi-
cal condition) would qualify for aid-in-dying. Someone suffering
from a solely psychological condition (such as situational depres-
sion) would NOT be eligible.
"Before any aid-in-dying is given, a person must....
- Record an official request for assistance, witnessed by two
unrelated, disinterested persons.
- Be examined and counseled by two physicians to determine if
the person has an eligible condition and to explore all possible
alternatives...
- Be examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist, to determine
the person's mental competence.
- Be counseled by a social worker to explore social service and
support services which might assist the person in living in
comfort and dignity.
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- Be counseled by a professional in pain management or a cer-
tified hospice professional, where appropriate, to explore op-
tions that might alleviate suffering.
- Have compliance with this process certified by the probate
court.
- Make two further direct requests for aid-in-dying to the at-
tending physician witnessed by two unrelated, disinterested
persons, with a waiting period of 7 days between the requests."
I am not, as the humor columnist says, making this up; this is
the proposal supported by the ACLU and Hemlock, the Commis-
sion's most ardent proponents of decriminalization. The alterna-
tive "procedural safeguards" proposal, developed by the Council
for Independent Living and ARC-Michigan (retarded citizens),
though explicitly written to protect disabled people whose lives
are said to be put in jeopardy by decriminalization of assisted
suicide, is in some ways more liberal, but in other ways stricter,
than the decriminalization model statute. (The title of the al-
ternative proposal is revealing: "Procedural Safeguards against
the Exploitation of Personal Autonomy and Vulnerability in the
Decision to Terminate One's Life".)17 Eligibility is based on "irre-
versible suffering from a physical condition at a level which the
individual finds unbearable." This delightfully vague statement
seems to allow more opportunity for the individual to decide
how much suffering is enough, compared with the decriminal-
ization proposal which says the suffering must "emanate" from
a physical condition as described. Under procedures, in addition
to the patient's assertion of his/her request witnessed by two
impartial witnesses, there are four required consultations. Before
each consultation the patient must "reaffirm his or her intent
to continue with the process." This is to be done (each time!)
by completing a form whose content is specified. Before each
consultation the patient must also request a "treatment summary"
be sent to the consulting professional.
The consultations are with a physician who not only verifies
the condition but is given several other powers and responsibili-
ties including "to document barriers, including financial barriers,
which prevent the individual from accessing identified health
care interventions"; a social worker, a mental health worker, and
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"at least one other expert who could provide meaningful sup-
port and assistance to ameliorate the unbearable suffering of the
individual [including hospice]. . ." The mental health worker is
required to call in a second professional if necessary to assess
competence; absolute power is given to the mental health work-
ers to terminate the process if "impaired judgment" is discov-
ered (the document does not say what to do if the mental health
workers disagree about this, nor does it say whether the patient
adjudged impaired may dismiss the mental health worker and
choose another).
To assure that no stone is left unturned in exploring alterna-
tives to suicide, the proposal also mandates what seem to be a
whole series of further referrals: "In addition to performing the
tasks specified, each [emphasis added] of the consulting profes-
sionals will be responsible to offer a referral to a 'Personal Advo-
cate,' [not defined] whose role it will be to assist the individual
in accessing those support services which the individual chooses
to pursue."
When all of these consultation are completed, the Probate
court then has an oversight role "to ensure compliance with the
procedures."
Whether it is possible, not to say ethical and moral, to con-
struct legislation whose restrictions are so onerous as to discour-
age people from using its provisions, is a question for philoso-
phers and legal theorists. Questions of unconscionable conditions
aside, it remains to be seen who would be eligible for the aid-in-
dying privilege, and for what it would be that they are eligible.
One can appreciate that under both proposals eligibility is not
restricted to those with terminal conditions suffering unmanage-
able pain, but extends to those with degenerative diseases and
"unacceptable" suffering, a term not defined other than by impli-
cation to exclude "a solely psychological condition." Would Mrs.
Eddy be eligible? Would all of the AIDS victims? The promising
vagueness of both the first and second proposals cannot be said
to exclude that they might, though doctors fearing prosecution
might prudently hesitate to certify them as eligible under the
certification requirements. I would suggest however that any "el-
igibility" criteria failing to meet the Mrs. Eddy test-a test based
simply on the premise that someone who is going to kill herself
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anyway ought to have the right to be helped by her physician,
without the physician being put at risk of criminal prosecution-
is unsatisfactory.
More interesting is the question of what are the benefits for
which beneficiaries of the legislation would be eligible. After
publication of the Commission's report its chair, Howard Brody,
a medical doctor who is also a thoughtful and respected professor
of philosophy, published an article (Brody, 1994) expressing his
disappointment. It was not the Commission's inability to offer
guidance to the legislature that troubled him, but the lack of
philosophical analysis in the Commission's three proposals. Cit-
ing recently published work, Brody pointed out two alternative
methods of terminating life, both based on hospice techniques:
Mrs. Eddy's route, refusal of nutrition with medical support; and
"barbiturate coma," used to assist patients who fail to respond to
more routine pain management, in which patients are rendered
comatose until death occurs, often in a matter of hours. The ques-
tion is whether either of these methods ought to be regarded as
the "aid-in-dying" to which the proposals' procedural safeguards
would apply. If so, then these two techniques, which are pre-
sumptively legal even under the absolute ban, would be subject
to restrictive conditions which might make them unavailable in
many cases. If not, then the procedural safeguards would protect
people very largely from lethal injections and effective crudities
such as back-of-the-van carbon monoxide, which in any case
Dr. Kevorkian has resorted to only since the cancellation of his
medical license removed his access to lethal drugs. (Kevorkian's
original "suicide machine" provided a self-injected lethal dose of
potassium chloride. Access to this or similar apparatus would be
regulated under the procedural safeguards.)
A month after the release of the Commission's report, Dr.
Brody and five co-authors published, in the prestigious New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine, a proposal for regulating physician-assist-
ed death (Miller, F. G, et al, 1994). The centerpiece of the proposal is
mandatory counselling with a trained "palliative care specialist."
No other counselling is required. The function of this consultant
is partly medical but also partly judicial, as he or she is given
appealable veto power over the decision (the consultant's veto
can be appealed to a "palliative care committee," whose decision
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is final). There are at least two difficulties with the scheme: it
is not clear on what grounds other than non-voluntariness the
consultant could exercise the veto,18 nor does the proposal dis-
cuss the problem of "forum shopping," ie, how patients could be
prevented from selecting consultants known to be favorable to
patient's expressed wishes. These difficulties aside however the
scheme seems humane and workable with minimum intrusions
and burdens, though its quasi-judicial apparatus would clearly
not satisfy those proponents of assisted suicide who wish to see
no outside interference on the exercise of the right to die. There
is no evidence in the Michigan Commission report that such a
proposal was even considered by the Commission.
Conclusion
Because of the activism and propagandizing of Dr. Kevorkian,
and its mixture of labor union liberalism, human rights activism,
and Right to Life religious conservativism, Michigan is doubtless
among the most advanced 19 of the states in discussion of assisted
suicide, so it might have been hoped that the appointment of
a commission to recommend approaches to the problem would
have led to some humane resolution which, if not satisfactory
to everyone, would be accepted by all but the most unyielding.
Establishment of a commission could be seen as a legitimate and
even statesmanlike maneuver by a legislature anxious to obtain
some distance from the emotional issue and searching for a rela-
tively objective point of view. The failure of the Commission not
only to agree on a reasonable proposal but even to lay out fairly
the dimensions of the issue and present the plausible alternative
solutions, has disappointed those who may have entertained such
hopes, and the recent election, coupled with the Supreme Court
decision, has apparently assured that these who oppose any de-
criminalization will carry the day. Opponents see assisted suicide
as a piece with euthanasia and abortion, which they regard as the
great moral evils of our culture. Proponents of decriminalization
seem to lack the moral vigor focused on other human rights
issues. Disability advocates, adept at media manipulation, regard
decriminalization as suspicious and possibly dangerous (Miller,
P. S., 1993). Minorities, who were not present on the Commission
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(no members and only two alternates were black) also distrust
decriminalization and appeared before it to express their opposi-
tion.20 The medical profession is not only split but worried, and
unlikely to go much beyond its current neutral position.
Since Dr. Kevorkian was acquitted under the former statute,
those who are opposed in principle to any decriminalization will
have to solve the problem of jury nullification, so it is unclear that
the Legislature would gain anything were it to reenact the former
ban. But any legislation purporting to clarify the status of assisted
suicide short of an outright ban is likely to be subjected not only
to restrictive procedural conditions but to tight definitions lim-
iting who is eligible for the assistance and the kind of medical
procedures that are allowed; this could end up criminalizing,
or encumbering with procedural safeguards, procedures such
as barbiturate coma and even assistance in refusal of nutrition
which are presumptively legal and in principle available even
under the current prohibition. If that is the outcome, the failure
of the Commission will mean more than an opportunity missed to
provide relief to those in need; it will also mean that relief has been
taken away from sufferers who might have been entitled to it.
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APPENDIX I: MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION
Michigan Commission on Death and Dying
Members and Alternate Members and Officers
Howard Brody, Chairperson
Elsa Shartsis, Vice Chairperson
Deborah Cummings, Secretary
American Association of Retired Persons
Mable Meites, Member
Mary Alice Shulman, Alternate Member
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan
Elsa Shartsis, Member
Ronald Bishop, Alternate Member
Citizens For Better Care
Marie P. Iverson, Member
Susan Titus, Alternate Member
Health Care Association of Michigan
Wanda Baad, Member
Helen Wentz, Alternate Member
Hemlock of Michigan
Daniel C. Devine, Member
Shaw Livermore, Alternate Member
Michigan Association for Retarded Citizens
Robert D. Aranosian, Member
Marjorie J. Mitchell, Alternate Member
Michigan Association of Osteopathic Physicians &
Surgeons
Joseph A. Balog, Member
Melvin Linden, Alternate Member
Michigan Association of Suicidology
Kenneth T. Morris, Member
Alton Kirk, Alternate Member
Michigan Council on Independent Living
Penny Crawley, Member
John Sanford, Alternate Member
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APPENDIX II: PUBLIC ACT NO. 3, PUBLIC ACTS
OF 1993
STATE OF MICHIGAN
Sec 7. (1) A person who has knowledge that another person
intends to commit or attempt to commit suicide and who inten-
tionally does either of the following is guilty of criminal assistance
to suicide, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than
4 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both:
(a) Provides the physical means by which the other person at-
tempts or commits suicide.
(b) Participates in a physical act by which the other person at-
tempts or commits suicide.
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to withholding or withdrawing
medical treatment.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to prescribing, dispensing, or
administering medications or procedures if the intent is to
relieve pain or discomfort and not to cause death, even if the
medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk of
death.
(4) This section shall take effect February 25, 1993.
(5) This section is repealed effective 6 months after the date the
commission makes its recommendations to the legislature
pursuant to section 4.
Section 2. This amendatory act shall take effect February 25,
1993.
This act is ordered to take immediate effect.
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Notes
1. Mich vs. Kevorkian, (-Mich__-), Mich. Supreme Court, five cases decided
Dec. 13, 1994. Three of the cases involved lower court decisions rejecting
various prosecutions of Dr. Kevorkian; these prosecutions were effectively
reinstated by the Michigan Supreme Court. The other two cases were suits
for declaratory relief brought by petitioners alleging terminal illness and
asking for the right to obtain suicide assistance. These petitions were re-
jected.
2. The felony of "assistance to suicide" was created with an expiration fore-
seen to thwart Dr. Kevorkian while the Commission deliberated. Before
its presumed expiration, the statute had been declared unconstitutional for
technical reasons by four Michigan courts, but the Michigan Supreme Court,
stayed the Appeals Court orders and then reversed. It was widely reported
in November that the prohibition had indeed expired as scheduled, but the
legal situation was at that point far from clear. The legislation creating the
Commission and enacting the temporary ban required the Commission to
report "within 15 months after the effective date of this act," ie, by May
23 1994. The section (#7) prohibiting "assistance to suicide" "is repealed
effective 6 months after the commission makes its recommendations to the
legislature." Because of the legal challenges and court rulings, the report
issued by the commission dated 6 June may or may not be the report required
by the statute to set the six-month clock running. The report itself was not
issued as a document of the state of Michigan, but was published by the
Michigan State Medical Society. In overturning lower court decisions and
holding that the statute was not unconstitutional, the Michigan Supreme
court failed to address the question (presumably made irrelevant by its
ruling) whether the temporary ban had even expired.
3. A recent Detroit News poll revealed that 57% of Michigan residents favor
allowing assisted suicide under some restrictions, while 9% favor allowing
it without restrictions. Only 30% favored an absolute ban. According to
a letter in the New England Journal of Medicine (331:812-813, Sept 22 '94)
a survey of Michigan physicians showed that 41% of physicians favored
allowing assisted suicide under some circumstances, 17% favored keeping
it illegal, and 37% preferred to have no legislation on the subject.
4. In the lame duck legislative session which ended in Dec. 1994, majorities in
each house voted for a permanent absolute ban, but the two houses failed to
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agree on whether the question should be put to a vote of the people, and the
legislation died with the session. The legislature elected in 1994 is slightly
more conservative (ie, Republican) than its predecessor.
5. The headline reads "A Woman Charts an Unusual Route to Death."
6. People v. Kevorkian, Detroit Recorder's Court, #93-10158. The jury verdict
of acquittal was returned May 2 after a five-day trial. Thomas Hyde was the
17th of the patients helped to die by Kevorkian since 1990 (as of June 27,
1995).
7. State of Michigan 87th Legislature, Public Act #3 of 1993, approved Feb. 25
1993.
8. The Nonprofit Homes Association, which abstained on all three proposals.
However their representative was said to be active in discussion.
9. From the Times: "The commission's vote was delayed for several hours when
more than a dozen members of Adapt, a group advocating rights for the
disabled, burst into the conference room in motorized wheelchairs, carrying
signs saying 'Extermination without representation' and 'Hey-hey, ho-ho,
this commissions has got to go!"'
10. In May 1994 the Michigan State Medical Society rejected attempts to put it on
record either for or against a ban on physician assisted suicide, voting 85-32
to take no position. The MSMS had only the year before become the first state
medical society in the nation to change its position from anti-assisted suicide
to neutral (American Medical News Ap. 11, 1994). The neutral policy calls for
physicians to exhaust every alternative before resorting to assisting suicide
(Kalamazoo Gazette, May 8 1994). This position is interpreted by some as
affirming the individual physician's right to follow his or her conscience;
protecting the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship seems to be the
major concern of state medical societies. Outgoing MSMS president Gilbert
Bluhm was quoted as saying that doctors need to make up their minds on
the issue. However American Medical Association Chair Lonnie Bristow of
San Pablo Calif has already made up his mind: "It is not ethical for physi-
cians to take part in that kind of activity... abuses will occur." (American
Medical News, May 16 1994). The national AMA has recently strengthened
its position, calling assisted suicide "totally incompatible" with the ends of
medicine.
In May 1994 the Oregon Medical Association was also unable to take a
position on the ballot initiative to be voted on in November. The Association
split virtually equally three ways: for, against, and "let the public decide."
However the Association "declined to reaffirm" the national AMA position
opposing the participation of physicians in ending a patient's life. (American
Medical News, May 16, 1994). And a recent study of doctors in Washington
state showed equally deep divisions (NY Times, July 17,1994). (The Oregon
initiative allowing assisted suicide in certain narrowly defined cases was
enacted by a small margin).
11. The full commission met 11 times at the state capital, and held 6 public
forums at cities across the state. One procedural and five policy subcommit-
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tees were organized; these latter reported by Dec. 20, 1993. Three drafting
committees reported at the meeting of Feb. 3,1994. As a point of interest here,
information was provided on the situation in the Netherlands by Dr. Herbert
Cohen and Mrs. Jean Tromp Meesters of that country, and by Dr. Charles
Gomez of Virginia, who has published a book on euthanasia in Holland.
Additionally, I. John Keown of Queen's College and Ms. Demetra Pappas
provided information on the Feb. 1994 report (firmly opposing assisted
suicide) of the Select Committee of the British House of Lords.
12. Michigan has now enacted into law certain measures designed to remove
some of the obstacles to access to pain relief.
13. The position of the Michigan Psychiatric Association appears to be stronger
than the vote suggests. According to a letter published as part of the commis-
sion report, the Council of the MPS voted "Yes on removing the ban; abstain
on allowing physician-approved physician-assisted suicide; no on allowing
assisted suicide with counselling and 'safeguards."' This appears to mean
that the MPA either favors an absence of legislation (contrary to the impli-
cation in the report that there was consensus on the need for legislation), or
legislation enabling assisted suicide but not imposing safeguards.
The letter from the MPA Council was provoked by its delegate voting
contrary to her instructions. The Council removed its delegate and asked
the Commission to change its vote.
14. A sub-group of seniors was also represented by Citizens for Better Care,
which describes itself as "a state wide consumer advocacy organization
concerned with the quality of life and the quality of care for the residents of
long term care facilities.. ." Its position was that "decriminalizing assisted
suicide WITHOUT assuring that those who choose to end their lives are
aware of services which may be available would be wrong." ("Report,"
Appendix A). This led it to abstain on proposals both to decriminalize and
to continue the ban, and to support only the second proposal, safeguards
without recommendation. In contrast, the Senior Advocates Council voted
yes on both the first and second proposals and no on the third.
15. Whose representative, John O'Hair, was himself a prosecutor who had pros-
ecuted Dr. Kevorkian, though expressing personal opposition to the prohi-
bition on assisted suicide. He was said to be a leader among the decriminal-
ization group.
16. Right to Life Michigan's statement fails to address the second proposal.
17. This proposal first attempts to address the fear of active euthansia; it does so
by what its summary calls "a definition of assistance with self-termination"
to prevent active euthanasia: "Definition. The actual act which ends an indi-
vidual's life must be carried out by the individual." However no definition
of "actual act" nor of "carried out" is provided, and the distinction may
seem hazy at best. Dr. Kevorkian placed the string to the CO machine in
Thomas Hyde's hand. If Hyde then tried to pull the string but failed due
to his ALS, then under the proposal one would have to say either that the
correct procedure by Kevorkian would be to stop the intervention, detach
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Hyde from the machine and send him home; or, if this seems unpalatable,
that once Hyde had begun the act, or even attempted to begin the act, then
the "actual act" requirement is satisfied, and Kevorkian is free to complete
the string pulling. One can imagine similar hair-splitting with regard to
injections; one can also imagine prosecutions turning on whether Hyde had
tried sufficiently to begin the act, or whether his failure to complete the pull
amounted to a change of mind. (If the latter, a willing but unable patient
could never obtain relief).
It may be noted that as a philosophical question, whether passive acts such
as refusal to eat are "acts" or merely "not doings" is probably an undecidable
question. Thus if "an actual act carried out by the individual" is required
to trigger the safeguards, it could be argued that a person who proposes to
starve himself to death is not covered by the safeguards even if he requires
the assistance of a physician to provide comfort and pain relief.
18. Dr. Brody has informed my by letter that the intent is that the palliative care
physician determine whether the patient has a medical condition justifying
assisted suicide.
19. Several states have held referenda, and a commission in New York state has
issued a report which opposes legalization. One main objection was that
suicide would be granted inappropriately by doctors who are untrained
to recognize or treat depression (NY Times, May 26, 1994, pg. 1). Assisting
someone to commit suicide is manslaughter in New York. The NY statute
is being challenged in Federal court, Quill v. Koppell, 94 Civ. 5321. The
plaintiff is the physician whose essay describing how he administered a fatal
injection to a patient provoked both controversy and a criminal investigation
(National Law Inl, Aug. 1 '94, pg A8).
20. One black witness was quoted as saying "I took an unscientific survey at my
local working class bar... They said, 'Wilbur, we don't even trust doctors
to keep us alive!"' NY Times, Mar. 6, 1994.
This paper is a revised and updated version of a report made to the 10th
International Conference of the World Federation of Right to Die Societies,
held in Bath, England, 7-10 Sept. 1994; I am grateful to the organizers for the
invitation to speak. The earlier version was read to the Center for the Study of
Ethics in Society, Western Michigan University, Sept. 21, 1994, and has been
published by the Center (Papers Published by the Center, vol. 8 no. 1). In
preparing the paper I have had the benefit of conversation with three members
of the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying: Howard Brody, MD, PhD;
Fr. Thomas Schindler, PhD; Elsa Shartsis, JD. They are not of course responsible
for the opinions expressed nor for any errors I may have made.
